scap-security-guide September 2013

scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org

31 participants
120 discussions

RE: scap-security-guide Digest, Vol 25, Issue 74
by Saxon, William G CIV SPAWARSYSCEN-ATLANTIC, 58810 27 Sep '13

27 Sep '13

The CTO to which David is referring is 10-17 (28 July 2010) which mandates that HBSS be deployed on all Linux and Unix systems. I asked DISA about the HBSS/SELinux conflict and this was their reply: "SELinux is not compatible with HBSS...you can either use SELinux as is and submit a waiver to Cybercom, disable the SE features and install the required point product(s) (if possible), or migrate to a different OS." When I contacted the HBSS office to find out how to get a waiver, they told me that a waiver was not necessary and that there was a "verbal understanding" between Cybercom and HBSS to give *nix systems flexibility in their configuration until the HBSS/SELinux conflict is resolved which is why Brain's system made it through IV&V. Granted, informal "understandings" within the DoD make me nervous but that is where we are in right now. So what's the best way to articulate this within a STIG? Beats me. I suggest the following for group discussion: ============================ Group ID (Vulid): V-38667 Group Title: SRG-OS-000196 Rule ID: SV-50468r1_rule Severity: CAT II Rule Version (STIG-ID): RHEL-06-000285 Rule Title: The system must have a host-based intrusion detection tool and/or a host-based intrusion prevention tool installed. Vulnerability Discussion: Adding host-based intrusion detection tools can provide the capability to automatically take actions in response to malicious behavior, which can provide additional agility in reacting to network threats. These tools also often include a reporting capability to provide network awareness of the system, which may not otherwise exist in an organization's systems management regime. For DoD systems, the McAfee Host-based Security System (HBSS) is provided to fulfill this role. Adding host-based intrusion prevention tools increases system security by confining privileged programs and user sessions. SELinux is provided to fulfill this role. At this time, HBSS and SELinux are not compatible. Check Content: Inspect the system to determine if intrusion detection software or intrusion prevention software has been installed. Verify the installed software is active. If neither a host-based intrusion detection tool (For DoD systems, this is HBSS) nor a host-based intrusion prevention tool (SELinux) is installed, this is a finding. Fix Text: Install either a host-based intrusion detection tool (For DoD systems, install HBSS) or a host-based intrusion prevention tool (SELinux). ======================== William G. (Bill) Saxon, CISSP, GSLC, VIP, Security+, Network+, Master and B.S. CpE, B.S. PHY CSWF IAM2/IAT2 -----Original Message----- From: scap-security-guide-bounces(a)lists.fedorahosted.org [mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org] On Behalf Of scap-security-guide-request(a)lists.fedorahosted.org Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2013 8:00 To: scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: scap-security-guide Digest, Vol 25, Issue 74 Send scap-security-guide mailing list submissions to scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit https://lists.fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to scap-security-guide-request(a)lists.fedorahosted.org You can reach the person managing the list at scap-security-guide-owner(a)lists.fedorahosted.org When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of scap-security-guide digest..." Today's Topics: 1. RE: RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS (Moessbauer, David) 2. Re: RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS (Brian Peake) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 16:35:29 -0400 From: "Moessbauer, David" <david.moessbauer(a)progeny.net> To: "scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org" <scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org> Subject: RE: RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS Message-ID: <6BC30DD8322F394CB35455E71037B2F61252B95A58(a)ES2K7-MBX-1.progeny.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" I am not sure about your comment regarding "[HBSS] isn't *mandated.*" My experience with the fleet tells me otherwise, as both ODAA during accreditation and deployed platforms are requiring compliance with HBSS of our system. Additionally, I do believe I have seen a CTO distributed by the Navy that states otherwise, though I can't seem to put my hands on it at the moment. Please advise if I am incorrect in this belief. v/r David Moessbauer (410) 627-5633 (M) The Information contained in or attached to this communication may be confidential and privileged proprietary intended only for the individual/s or entity to whom/which it is addressed. Any unauthorized use, distribution, copying or disclosure of this information is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error please contact the sender immediately and delete from your system. -----Original Message----- From: scap-security-guide-bounces(a)lists.fedorahosted.org [mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org] On Behalf Of Truhn, Chad M CTR NSWCDD, CXA30 Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 4:12 PM To: scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: (nwl) RE: RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS Shawn, Reverting back to an email you sent to gov-sec back in June (attached), you said: " So, even though you've configured your system with all these auditing rules, configured AIDE for integrity checking, *and* have SELinux enforcing, FSO wants you to layer on an *additional* level of host intrusion detection which can provide "complementary or duplicative monitoring, reporting, and reaction capabilities." As stated in the STIG, DoD provides McAfee HBSS to perform this function. But it isn't *mandated.*" Then in ticket #262 from the SSG page: "HIPS is a category of technology, and while McAfee? is commonly used to meet this, is not tied to a particular product/vendor. Users would be wise to select technology which is certified to run on RHEL6 without disabling key OS level protection mechanisms (e.g., if McAfee? breaks your system, use something else)." [1] " MPO/FSO/RH: 3rd party products should work with the operating systems they run on, without forcing users to disable security mechanisms. Won't fix." I have always been confused about this language. Do we want SELinux enabled *AND* HIPS installed? Or should it be an *OR*? One says McAfee HBSS/HIPS is fine, another says it isn't. I'm confused!!! [1] https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide/ticket/262 -----Original Message----- From: scap-security-guide-bounces(a)lists.fedorahosted.org [mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org] On Behalf Of Shawn Wells Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 3:21 PM To: scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS I received the following note from a colleague today, outlining the wording changes between RHEL5 and RHEL6 regarding HBSS. I searched the mailing archives, and can't figure out *why* the language was changed. - Anyone remember why? - Objections to reverting to the RHEL5 language? EMail: > from the RHEL 6 STIG: > > ============================ > Group ID (Vulid): V-38667 > Group Title: SRG-OS-000196 > Rule ID: SV-50468r1_rule > Severity: CAT II > Rule Version (STIG-ID): RHEL-06-000285 Rule Title: The system must > have a host-based intrusion detection tool installed. > > Vulnerability Discussion: Adding host-based intrusion detection tools can provide the capability to automatically take actions in response to malicious behavior, which can provide additional agility in reacting to network threats. These tools also often include a reporting capability to provide network awareness of system, which may not otherwise exist in an organization's systems management regime. > > Check Content: > Inspect the system to determine if intrusion detection software has been installed. Verify the intrusion detection software is active. > If no host-based intrusion detection tools are installed, this is a finding. > > Fix Text: The base Red Hat platform already includes a sophisticated auditing system that can detect intruder activity, as well as SELinux, which provides host-based intrusion prevention capabilities by confining privileged programs and user sessions which may become compromised. > > Install an additional intrusion detection tool to provide complementary or duplicative monitoring, reporting, and reaction capabilities to those of the base platform. For DoD systems, the McAfee Host-based Security System is provided to fulfill this role. > ======================== > > > to look more like this from the RHEL 5 STIG: > > ========================= > Group ID (Vulid): V-782 > Group Title: GEN006480 > Rule ID: SV-37746r2_rule > Severity: CAT II > Rule Version (STIG-ID): GEN006480 > Rule Title: The system must have a host-based intrusion detection tool installed. > > Vulnerability Discussion: Without a host-based intrusion detection tool, there is no system-level defense when an intruder gains access to a system or network. Additionally, a host-based intrusion detection tool can provide methods to immediately lock out detected intrusion attempts. > > Responsibility: System Administrator > IAControls: ECID-1 > > Check Content: > Ask the SA or IAO if a host-based intrusion detection application is loaded on the system. The preferred intrusion detection system is McAfee HBSS available through Cybercom. If another host-based intrusion detection application, such as SELinux, is used on the system, this is not a finding. > ========================= > > People are getting confused and SElinux and HBSS are getting installed with SElinux being disabled to make things work. _______________________________________________ scap-security-guide mailing list scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org https://lists.fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide ------------------------------ Message: 2 Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2013 18:00:13 -0400 From: Brian Peake <PEAKE(a)HIPKLLC.COM> To: <scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org> Subject: Re: RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS Message-ID: <CE678204.7C03%PEAKE(a)HIPKLLC.COM> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" I believe the current guidance is to have McAfee Agent installed only. At least that is where we are at now, and just went through our IV&V. I also have uvscan installed along with AIDE w/ daily cron jobs for both. HIPS etcŠ are not "required". But again I am not an expert and do not delineate any guidance. I would have to find the guidance, and am on travel right now, however when I return my ePo/HBSS "guy" can give me the reference. Very Respectfully, Brian Peake On 9/24/13 4:35 PM, "Moessbauer, David" <david.moessbauer(a)progeny.net> wrote: >I am not sure about your comment regarding "[HBSS] isn't *mandated.*" > >My experience with the fleet tells me otherwise, as both ODAA during >accreditation and deployed platforms are requiring compliance with HBSS >of our system. Additionally, I do believe I have seen a CTO >distributed by the Navy that states otherwise, though I can't seem to >put my hands on it at the moment. > >Please advise if I am incorrect in this belief. > > >v/r > >David Moessbauer >(410) 627-5633 (M) > >The Information contained in or attached to this communication may be >confidential and privileged proprietary intended only for the >individual/s or entity to whom/which it is addressed. Any unauthorized >use, distribution, copying or disclosure of this information is >strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error >please contact the sender immediately and delete from your system. > > >-----Original Message----- >From: scap-security-guide-bounces(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >[mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org] On Behalf >Of Truhn, Chad M CTR NSWCDD, CXA30 >Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 4:12 PM >To: scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >Subject: (nwl) RE: RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS > >Shawn, > >Reverting back to an email you sent to gov-sec back in June (attached), >you said: > >" So, even though you've configured your system with all these auditing >rules, configured AIDE for integrity checking, *and* have SELinux >enforcing, FSO wants you to layer on an *additional* level of host >intrusion detection which can provide "complementary or duplicative >monitoring, reporting, and reaction capabilities." > >As stated in the STIG, DoD provides McAfee HBSS to perform this function. >But it isn't *mandated.*" > > >Then in ticket #262 from the SSG page: > >"HIPS is a category of technology, and while McAfee? is commonly used >to meet this, is not tied to a particular product/vendor. Users would >be wise to select technology which is certified to run on RHEL6 without >disabling key OS level protection mechanisms (e.g., if McAfee? breaks >your system, use something else)." [1] > >" MPO/FSO/RH: 3rd party products should work with the operating systems >they run on, without forcing users to disable security mechanisms. >Won't fix." > > > > >I have always been confused about this language. Do we want SELinux >enabled *AND* HIPS installed? Or should it be an *OR*? One says >McAfee HBSS/HIPS is fine, another says it isn't. I'm confused!!! > > >[1] https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide/ticket/262 > > > > >-----Original Message----- >From: scap-security-guide-bounces(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >[mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org] On Behalf >Of Shawn Wells >Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 3:21 PM >To: scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >Subject: RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS > >I received the following note from a colleague today, outlining the >wording changes between RHEL5 and RHEL6 regarding HBSS. I searched the >mailing archives, and can't figure out *why* the language was changed. > >- Anyone remember why? >- Objections to reverting to the RHEL5 language? > >EMail: >> from the RHEL 6 STIG: >> >> ============================ >> Group ID (Vulid): V-38667 >> Group Title: SRG-OS-000196 >> Rule ID: SV-50468r1_rule >> Severity: CAT II >> Rule Version (STIG-ID): RHEL-06-000285 Rule Title: The system must >> have a host-based intrusion detection tool installed. >> >> Vulnerability Discussion: Adding host-based intrusion detection tools >>can provide the capability to automatically take actions in response >>to malicious behavior, which can provide additional agility in >>reacting to network threats. These tools also often include a >>reporting capability to provide network awareness of system, which may >>not otherwise exist in an organization's systems management regime. >> >> Check Content: >> Inspect the system to determine if intrusion detection software has >>been installed. Verify the intrusion detection software is active. >> If no host-based intrusion detection tools are installed, this is a >>finding. >> >> Fix Text: The base Red Hat platform already includes a sophisticated >>auditing system that can detect intruder activity, as well as SELinux, >>which provides host-based intrusion prevention capabilities by >>confining privileged programs and user sessions which may become compromised. >> >> Install an additional intrusion detection tool to provide >>complementary or duplicative monitoring, reporting, and reaction >>capabilities to those of the base platform. For DoD systems, the >>McAfee Host-based Security System is provided to fulfill this role. >> ======================== >> >> >> to look more like this from the RHEL 5 STIG: >> >> ========================= >> Group ID (Vulid): V-782 >> Group Title: GEN006480 >> Rule ID: SV-37746r2_rule >> Severity: CAT II >> Rule Version (STIG-ID): GEN006480 >> Rule Title: The system must have a host-based intrusion detection >>tool installed. >> >> Vulnerability Discussion: Without a host-based intrusion detection >>tool, there is no system-level defense when an intruder gains access >>to a system or network. Additionally, a host-based intrusion detection >>tool can provide methods to immediately lock out detected intrusion attempts. >> >> Responsibility: System Administrator >> IAControls: ECID-1 >> >> Check Content: >> Ask the SA or IAO if a host-based intrusion detection application is >>loaded on the system. The preferred intrusion detection system is >>McAfee HBSS available through Cybercom. If another host-based >>intrusion detection application, such as SELinux, is used on the >>system, this is not a finding. >> ========================= >> >> People are getting confused and SElinux and HBSS are getting >>installed with SElinux being disabled to make things work. > > > >_______________________________________________ >scap-security-guide mailing list >scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >https://lists.fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide >_______________________________________________ >scap-security-guide mailing list >scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org >https://lists.fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide > ------------------------------ _______________________________________________ scap-security-guide mailing list scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org https://lists.fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide End of scap-security-guide Digest, Vol 25, Issue 74 ***************************************************

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[PATCH] OVAL signoff on service_rhnsd_disabled.xml
by Tony James 27 Sep '13

27 Sep '13

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Fwd: Kickstart with SSG/fixes and More
by Shawn Wells 27 Sep '13

27 Sep '13

For those who don't know Ted Brunell, he works at RHT as a Solution Architect handling USMC and some Army elements. He created a kickstart script against SSG, sharing here with his permission. Thanks, Ted! -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Kickstart with SSG/fixes and More Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2013 15:24:15 -0400 (EDT) From: Ted Brunell <tbrunell(a)redhat.com> To: Shawn Wells <swells(a)redhat.com> I thought you'd like to see this. I used SSG inside of a kickstart and found that I had a way to go to get close to 100%. I did a bunch of sed scripting but am still only hitting 86.67%. Lots of false hits particularly with /etc/audit/audit.rules settings. Somethings like GNOME settings fail even though GNOME is not installed. Seems like it should detect GNOME and pass if the setting cannot be set. Kickstart and before/after SSG reports are attached. R/ Ted Ted Brunell - RHCDS, RHCE, RHCVA Senior Solution Architect Red Hat, Inc. (c) 760-712-6837 tbrunell(a)redhat.com

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[PATCH] root user PATH checks
by Maura Dailey 27 Sep '13

27 Sep '13

I tested both checks by running as the root user. I also noted that the check that was meant to look for group and world write permissions was incorrectly returning with a result of "does not exist". I fixed up the check and tested it. It now appears to work correctly. Maura Dailey (1): Updated and tested root path checks .../checks/accounts_dangerous_path_for_root.xml | 67 +++++++++++++------- .../checks/accounts_root_path_dirs_no_write.xml | 59 +++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)

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[PATCH] [bugfix] Invalid dates in RHEL6 RPM spec file
by Shawn Wells 27 Sep '13

27 Sep '13

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[PATCH] [Fedora] Introduce better rpm versioning scheme
by Jan Lieskovsky 26 Sep '13

26 Sep '13

Prior being able to provide additional checks for Fedora, I needed to modify the way how newly generated Fedora rpm packages will be versioned. This patch introduces better versioning scheme for Fedora rpm packages. Former state: Generated tarball was based on package name and version only, therefore the sequence would be (IOW raising "too quickly"): scap-security-guide-0.1.tar.gz scap-security-guide-0.2.tar.gz .. Proposed state: Generated tarball to be based on package name, version, and Fedora spec's release, thus the sequence to be: scap-security-guide-0.1-1.tar.gz - "stable" release scap-security-guide-0.1-2.rc1.tar.gz \ scap-security-guide-0.1-2.rc2.tar.gz \ .. "devel" releases scap-security-guide-0.1-2.rc9.tar.gz / scap-security-guide-0.1-2.tar.gz - another "stable" release, incorporating changes from rc1 up to rc9 .. Regression testing - proposed patch has been tested and confirmed as working wrt to the following: * Fedora tarball, source rpm, and rpm generation, * Fedora guide, content, checks, validate && eval-common Makefile rules. This is an (s)rpm generation / functionality related patch. No change has been made to existing Fedora content. Please review. Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Technologies Team

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RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS
by Shawn Wells 24 Sep '13

24 Sep '13

I received the following note from a colleague today, outlining the wording changes between RHEL5 and RHEL6 regarding HBSS. I searched the mailing archives, and can't figure out *why* the language was changed. - Anyone remember why? - Objections to reverting to the RHEL5 language? EMail: > from the RHEL 6 STIG: > > ============================ > Group ID (Vulid): V-38667 > Group Title: SRG-OS-000196 > Rule ID: SV-50468r1_rule > Severity: CAT II > Rule Version (STIG-ID): RHEL-06-000285 > Rule Title: The system must have a host-based intrusion detection tool installed. > > Vulnerability Discussion: Adding host-based intrusion detection tools can provide the capability to automatically take actions in response to malicious behavior, which can provide additional agility in reacting to network threats. These tools also often include a reporting capability to provide network awareness of system, which may not otherwise exist in an organization's systems management regime. > > Check Content: > Inspect the system to determine if intrusion detection software has been installed. Verify the intrusion detection software is active. > If no host-based intrusion detection tools are installed, this is a finding. > > Fix Text: The base Red Hat platform already includes a sophisticated auditing system that can detect intruder activity, as well as SELinux, which provides host-based intrusion prevention capabilities by confining privileged programs and user sessions which may become compromised. > > Install an additional intrusion detection tool to provide complementary or duplicative monitoring, reporting, and reaction capabilities to those of the base platform. For DoD systems, the McAfee Host-based Security System is provided to fulfill this role. > ======================== > > > to look more like this from the RHEL 5 STIG: > > ========================= > Group ID (Vulid): V-782 > Group Title: GEN006480 > Rule ID: SV-37746r2_rule > Severity: CAT II > Rule Version (STIG-ID): GEN006480 > Rule Title: The system must have a host-based intrusion detection tool installed. > > Vulnerability Discussion: Without a host-based intrusion detection tool, there is no system-level defense when an intruder gains access to a system or network. Additionally, a host-based intrusion detection tool can provide methods to immediately lock out detected intrusion attempts. > > Responsibility: System Administrator > IAControls: ECID-1 > > Check Content: > Ask the SA or IAO if a host-based intrusion detection application is loaded on the system. The preferred intrusion detection system is McAfee HBSS available through Cybercom. If another host-based intrusion detection application, such as SELinux, is used on the system, this is not a finding. > ========================= > > People are getting confused and SElinux and HBSS are getting installed with SElinux being disabled to make things work.

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RE: RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS (UNCLASSIFIED)
by Beavers, Randall D. CTR (US) 24 Sep '13

24 Sep '13

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Caveats: NONE I'm with Leam. We use BOTH on our system, but not together. HBSS and SELinux doesn't play well together. Additionally, the HIPS portion of HBSS only partially works with Linux. We had to implement IPTables to fix the firewall portion of HIPS. v/r, Randy Beavers, GSLC, CISSP Information Assurance Engineer Joint Battle Command-Platform 6000-C Technology Drive Huntsville, AL 35805 256-842-5426 (work) 256-289-6054 (cell) 256-876-2576 (fax) randall.d.beavers.ctr(a)mail.mil randall.d.beavers.ctr(a)mail.smil.mil -----Original Message----- From: scap-security-guide-bounces(a)lists.fedorahosted.org [mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org] On Behalf Of leam hall Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 2:43 PM To: scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: Re: RHEL5 vs RHEL6 language on HBSS Since HBSS and SELinux don't play well together, I'm for reverting. Leam On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 3:21 PM, Shawn Wells <shawn(a)redhat.com> wrote: I received the following note from a colleague today, outlining the wording changes between RHEL5 and RHEL6 regarding HBSS. I searched the mailing archives, and can't figure out *why* the language was changed. - Anyone remember why? - Objections to reverting to the RHEL5 language? EMail: from the RHEL 6 STIG: ============================ Group ID (Vulid): V-38667 Group Title: SRG-OS-000196 Rule ID: SV-50468r1_rule Severity: CAT II Rule Version (STIG-ID): RHEL-06-000285 Rule Title: The system must have a host-based intrusion detection tool installed. Vulnerability Discussion: Adding host-based intrusion detection tools can provide the capability to automatically take actions in response to malicious behavior, which can provide additional agility in reacting to network threats. These tools also often include a reporting capability to provide network awareness of system, which may not otherwise exist in an organization's systems management regime. Check Content: Inspect the system to determine if intrusion detection software has been installed. Verify the intrusion detection software is active. If no host-based intrusion detection tools are installed, this is a finding. Fix Text: The base Red Hat platform already includes a sophisticated auditing system that can detect intruder activity, as well as SELinux, which provides host-based intrusion prevention capabilities by confining privileged programs and user sessions which may become compromised. Install an additional intrusion detection tool to provide complementary or duplicative monitoring, reporting, and reaction capabilities to those of the base platform. For DoD systems, the McAfee Host-based Security System is provided to fulfill this role. ======================== to look more like this from the RHEL 5 STIG: ========================= Group ID (Vulid): V-782 Group Title: GEN006480 Rule ID: SV-37746r2_rule Severity: CAT II Rule Version (STIG-ID): GEN006480 Rule Title: The system must have a host-based intrusion detection tool installed. Vulnerability Discussion: Without a host-based intrusion detection tool, there is no system-level defense when an intruder gains access to a system or network. Additionally, a host-based intrusion detection tool can provide methods to immediately lock out detected intrusion attempts. Responsibility: System Administrator IAControls: ECID-1 Check Content: Ask the SA or IAO if a host-based intrusion detection application is loaded on the system. The preferred intrusion detection system is McAfee HBSS available through Cybercom. If another host-based intrusion detection application, such as SELinux, is used on the system, this is not a finding. ========================= People are getting confused and SElinux and HBSS are getting installed with SElinux being disabled to make things work. _______________________________________________ scap-security-guide mailing list scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org <mailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org> https://lists.fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide <https://lists.fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide> -- Mind on a Mission <http://leamhall.blogspot.com/> Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Caveats: NONE

2 1

Fixed reference tag in accounts_password_all_shadowed.xml
by Maura Dailey 23 Sep '13

23 Sep '13

Minor correction: the reference tag should have been in the metadata section, so I moved it. The make validate command no longer complains. I've committed the change and pushed it. - Maura Dailey

2 1

[PATCH 0/3] Additional OVAL signoffs
by David Smith 22 Sep '13

22 Sep '13

More OVAL testing and adding testrefs to the respective checks. David Smith (3): OVAL signoff for sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space OVAL signoff for sysctl_kernel_exec_shield OVAL signoff for multiple sysctl_net_ipv4 checks RHEL6/input/checks/sysctl_kernel_exec_shield.xml | 1 + .../checks/sysctl_kernel_randomize_va_space.xml | 1 + .../sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects.xml | 1 + ...ysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route.xml | 1 + .../sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians.xml | 1 + .../sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects.xml | 1 + .../sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects.xml | 1 + ...l_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route.xml | 1 + ...sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects.xml | 1 + RHEL6/input/checks/sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward.xml | 1 + 10 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

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scap-security-guide September 2013