scap-security-guide July 2014

scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org

20 participants
35 discussions

[PATCH 0/3] Updating NIST SP 800-53 References
by David Smith 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

This patchset updates the NIST control references throughout the XCCDF. A number of controls from Rev3 didn't make it into Rev4, and items that previously fell under those controls were incorporated into other controls. David Smith (3): updated transforms to reflect 800-53 rev4 updated 800-53 control references (services) updated 800-53 control references (system) RHEL/6/input/services/base.xml | 18 ++++---- RHEL/6/input/services/obsolete.xml | 28 +++++++------- RHEL/6/input/services/ssh.xml | 4 +- RHEL/6/input/system/auditing.xml | 58 ++++++++++++++-------------- RHEL/6/input/system/network/ipsec.xml | 2 +- RHEL/6/input/system/network/kernel.xml | 2 +- RHEL/6/input/system/network/wireless.xml | 8 ++-- RHEL/6/input/system/software/integrity.xml | 12 +++--- RHEL/6/transforms/constants.xslt | 2 +- RHEL/6/transforms/xccdf2html.xslt | 4 +- 10 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)

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bug in html report
by Kordell, Luke T 17 Jul '14

17 Jul '14

Hello, I think there may be a bug in the way the pass/fail percentage is computed in the html results from an open-scap scan. Currently I am showing 192 passes, 0 fails and 0 errors, but am at 96.79%. Is this actually a bug or am I missing something else? I am going to attach my scan-results to this email, please let me know if you require any further information. Regards, Luke Kordell

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[PATCH 1/2] [*/transforms/idtranslate.py] Allow shorthand format to contain <ind:variable_object> definition
by Jan Lieskovsky 16 Jul '14

16 Jul '14

Currently it's not possible the shorthand form of OVAL definition to contain <ind:variable_object> definition (based on previously defined <local_variable>). The reason behind this limitation being that idtranslate.py script (which is internally called by relabelids.py script, which is subsequently called during the benchmark build process) is not currently able to properly handle <ind:var_ref> element. When translating the OVAL ids idtranslate.py is able to correctly replace value of 'var_ref' attribute, but not able to translate the id when 'var_ref' isn't an attribute, but rather an tag / element directly. The <variable_object> definition expects the form of: <ind:variable_object id="object_id" version="1"> <ind:var_ref>reference_to_previously_defined_variable_used_in_the_check</ind:var_ref> </ind:variable_object> Since (currently) value of <ind:var_ref> element isn't properly translated into real ID, during the benchmark build process the error like the following is raised: ... [pattern] id 'variable_name' does not meet the expected pattern [oval:a-z...] This results in unability to successfully build the benchmark, when variable_object (containing by xsd required reference to var_ref) is used. Since I need the capability to define variable_objects (see the patch [2/2]), update idtranslate.py script (in RHEL/6 and also across the content) to be able to properly handle variable_objects (properly translate var_ref ids even in case it's listed as tag / element). The function / proper work of proposed change is confirmed by successful work of subsequent patch (see patch [2/2] for further details). Please review. Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Technologies Team

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SSG Git repository content now tagged (for versions from 0.1-6 through to v0.1.18)
by Jan Lieskovsky 15 Jul '14

15 Jul '14

Hello folks, jFYI mail that the content of SCAP Security Guide Git repository has been equipped with RHEL release tags today (for versions from v0.1-6 up to the most recent v0.1.18 one) [*] The tags are visible at (tarballs are now available for download via version id): https://git.fedorahosted.org/cgit/scap-security-guide.git and now it's also possible to use e.g. git describe: $ git describe v0.1.18-11-g3a4ed7b to find out: * which version is repository at (v0.1.18) * how many (committed) changes there have been from v0.1.18 release (11) * that this is a git managed version (g) * and most recent commit identifier. Starting from the next release (v0.1.19) I am considering to start using GPG signed tags -- let me know if these would be preferred / welcome? Enjoy. Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Technologies Team P.S.: [*] Older versions (X < 0.1-6) were intentionally kept untagged due the following two reasons: * they are using different versioning scheme (from v1.0-1 up to v1.0-5) * not that easy to identify particular commits making releases in these early SSG repository days

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[PATCH 0/2] copy-editing
by David Smith 11 Jul '14

11 Jul '14

This patchset does two primary things: 1) modifies two of the XSLT transforms to refer to NIST SP 800-53 rev4, instead of the current rev3 2) corrects a number of things and addresses inconsistences within the prose I haven't attempted a remapping of 800-53 controls for rev4, so that will likely still need to take place where applicable. David Smith (2): modified constants.xslt and xccdf2html.xslt to reflect 800-53 rev4 copy-editing for prose publication RHEL/6/input/intro/intro.xml | 2 +- RHEL/6/input/system/accounts/physical.xml | 18 +++++++------- RHEL/6/input/system/network/iptables.xml | 24 ++++++++++---------- RHEL/6/input/system/network/ipv6.xml | 10 ++++---- RHEL/6/input/system/network/wireless.xml | 8 +++--- RHEL/6/input/system/permissions/partitions.xml | 22 +++++++++--------- RHEL/6/input/system/software/disk_partitioning.xml | 2 +- RHEL/6/transforms/constants.xslt | 2 +- RHEL/6/transforms/xccdf2html.xslt | 4 +- 9 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)

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[PATCH] [*/utils/verify-input-sanity.py] Enhance 7031613 change -- show also what kind of error happened & line number it happened at
by Jan Lieskovsky 08 Jul '14

08 Jul '14

This patch enhances the change introduced in: [1] https://git.fedorahosted.org/cgit/scap-security-guide.git/commit/?id=7031613 it to be yet more verbose. Instead of reporting just file name, the error happened in, report also what kind of error happened & particular line number of that processed file, causing / leading to this error. Current verify-input-sanity.py output: utils]$ ./verify-input-sanity.py XML syntax error in file: src/input/checks/platform/rhel6-cpe-dictionary.xml XML syntax error in file: src/input/auxiliary/stig_overlay.xml Output once the change is applied: utils]$ ./verify-input-sanity.py XML syntax error in file src/input/checks/platform/rhel6-cpe-dictionary.xml: XML declaration allowed only at the start of the document, line 1, column 49 XML syntax error in file src/input/auxiliary/stig_overlay.xml: XML declaration allowed only at the start of the document, line 1, column 49 The patch changes the behaviour all across the content (i.e. for verify-input-sanity.py foreach of RHEL/6, RHEL/7, Fedora, Openstack & RHEVM3 -- tested for all cases, works fine). Please review. Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Technologies Team

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[PATCH 0001-0003] - various ssh and gconf fixes
by Gabe Alford 07 Jul '14

07 Jul '14

Hello, These patches should address a few sshd false positives [Patch 0001] and add support for %gconf-tree.xml [Patch 0002] as well as a recommendation to change remediation for the GDM login banner from a gdm user default to a gconf mandatory setting [Patch 0003]. [Patch 0001]: When initially running the scan, some sshd settings such as PermitRootLogin were showing that they were set correcly. This patch should fix those as well as hopefully address https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide/ticket/434 [Patch 0002]: Adds support to check %gconf-tree.xml. If %gconf-tree.xml exists (such as being deployed through Satellite), it takes precedence over any directory containing a %gconf.xml file under /etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory. Plus having a single configuration file to create/change/modify is always a plus. Could potentially help address https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide/ticket/282 [Patch 0003]: This is a recommendation to move setting the gdm banner and login settings from /var/lib/gdm to /etc/gconf/gconf.xml.mandatory. Reason for this is that the /etc/gconf directory is the location for administrators to set mandatory system policies over user set policies. Plus due to the gconf order of processing/precedance, it would be recommended to set under /etc rather than /var as anything set as a mandatory policy would be the default no matter what was in /var/lib/gdm. If approved, would potentially address https://fedorahosted.org/scap-security-guide/ticket/319 Thanks, Gabe

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Formalizing the release process / schedule
by Jan Lieskovsky 07 Jul '14

07 Jul '14

Hello folks, since the request to give more formalized shape to SSG release process / schedule appeared couple of times in the past already (to mention some example: https://lists.fedorahosted.org/pipermail/scap-security-guide/2014-May/00541…) and since we are hitting the doubt if already make / not to make yet a new release each time (each couple of weeks), we have decided to share the idea about SSG release process proposal. The proposal is to have release of new tarballs to happen at regular time (each 4 up to 6 weeks), and have a dedicated wiki page listing when the couple of upcoming releases will happen [1]. Something like Mozilla is doing for their products: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Releases https://wiki.mozilla.org/Releases#Upcoming_Releases https://wiki.mozilla.org/RapidRelease/Calendar From the observation period of 6 weeks is enough to have "sufficient count of new bug fixes / features requests" (aka the evolution step) these changes by themselves to form a need of a new release. But since it's difficult to decide if some patchset deserves new release (what's very valuable for someone, might not be that exciting / urgent for someone else etc.) to be fair we decided regular release period might be the best option how to balance out the various requests that might come out. Therefore starting from the next release we would like the release to happen regularly (each 4 up to 6 weeks - this to be decided yet. Feel free to vote for your preferences) at a date listed on the wiki page [2]. This could allow us establish automated functionality which could in sufficiently ahead period of time (for example week ago) notify the list the new release is coming and if someone is planning from their point of view critical patches to be included yet, those should be proposed / reviewed as soon as possible. To express personal opinion I would prefer the releases to happen on per 4 week scenario (while 6 weeks window might produce more changes in the tarball & less releases during the year at the end it also introduces some related inconsistency - one time the release would happen at start of the month, next time in the middle etc.) since it has the advantage the release will happen each time at regular (same) period, so users can update their functionality to better align upgrades with the schedule. Yet, since majority of us works on various / multiple projects, it might happen start of the week might not be the right time for new release (urgent action required somewhere else resulting into delay of a release etc.). Therefore I would propose the release to happen each first Friday in the month (the users could use the upcoming weekend to install the updates if / where appropriate). Feedback, comments, votes, proposals welcome. Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Technologies Team (on behalf of SSG upstream) [1] For now the wiki would contain just dates of past releases & dates of the upcoming ones (possibly also describing the release scheme). In the future it could provide further information what functionality each of the releases introduced (and taking it to the very advanced level hopefully too which functionality the new releases will contain in the future). [2] Once the scheme is clear (the proposal is approved), I will create that wiki page.

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[PATCH 2/2] [RHEL/6] (Re-)Implement audit_rules_privileged_commands OVAL check & start using it
by Jan Lieskovsky 07 Jul '14

07 Jul '14

Re-implement (the currently incorrect & unreferenced / unused) audit_rules_privileged_commands RHEL-6 check. The idea behind the check is roughly as follows -- the check works on comparing of two sets: * set A originally contains list of all privileged (setuid or setgid bit set) files found on the system (intentionally speaking about files, not executables above. Since former setuid / setgid can have the executable bit temporarily removed due some reason, we check - it's enough the file to have one of setuid / setgid set [IOW not checking if the file is executable]) * for each item from set A we prefix it with: --a always, exit ... -F path= prefix, and suffix it with -F ... -k privileged suffix. In other words for each setuid / setgid file found on the system we generate the full / expanded form of audit rule, we expect to be found. * second set B contains list of instances, following / matching the expected audit rule pattern, we have retrieved by looking into /etc/audit/audit.rules file * for each instance found (item from set B) we compare it for match with each item (pregenerated full audit rule form) from set A * besides the above, we need to ensure the dimensions / cardinality of both sets matches (e.g. what could happen being /etc/audit/audit.rules would contain all expected audit rules for setuid files, but none rule for setgid files. Checking just that each audit.rules rule is present in pregenerated list would succeed in this case too, even when it should fail. Therefore we add second, variable_test which compares if the cardinality of set A matches the cardinality of set B. If so, the test succeeds [the count of found audit.rules matches and has expected form than count of various setuid / setgid files, present on the system], otherwise failure is returned). Regardless of the OVAL check being such complex already currently, there are three limitations I am aware of wrt to it: * it will return success only in case the audit.rules have exactly the form (meaning order of various arguments) as expected / defined in the comment. Will have a look at possible permutations of -F ... arguments in the future yet (so it would pass also in case the rules are present there, but have one of the permutated forms), * it doesn't check if there isn't "Delete all rules" statement present somewhere in between / behind the audit rules definition (resulting not all of the rules to be actually taking into account by auditd). This is again space for future enhancement (will have a look), * for now the check has been tested & implemented just for RHEL-6. It's enhancement to cover RHEL-7 too will require more time & more testing. Again to come in subsequent version. Testing status: ------------------- The proposed check has been tested on RHEL-6 considering the following sub-cases that can happen & returns expected / appropriate result in each of them: 1) blank audit.rules file on the system -> returns FAIL V 2) audit.rules present, but no suid, no sgid rules defined -> returns FAIL V 3) audit.rules present, just suid audit rules defined -> returns FAIL V 4) audit.rules present, just sgid audit rules defined -> returns FAIL V 5) audit.rules present, both suid, sgid rules defined -> returns PASS v 6) audit.rules present, both suid / sgid, heading / trailing whitespace -> returns PASS v auditd doesn't allow comments in its config file (fails to restart if inline comment present) => this case isn't necessary to consider / cover. Please review. Thank you && Regards, Jan. --- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Technologies Team P.S.: Should you need to share testing scripts / scenario let me know.

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no_files_unowned_by_group rule issue
by Kordell, Luke T 07 Jul '14

07 Jul '14

Hello, I have been having an issue with the no_files_unowned_by_group rule. I am running scans on both a local system and a remote vm and both systems are failing. The OVAL output for the local system suggests that five root-owned files are causing the failure. In actuality these files are root:root. When I run a find / -xdev -nogroup -print I receive a slew of files that really do not have group ownership. Initially I wrote this off as a simple oval-output error, however my vm also fails the check and has no group-unowned files. The oval output for that failed-rule indicates that a single root-owned file (/.autofsk) is responsible for the failure. Is there a known-issue with this rule? Failed files on Local System //console.txt //.Xauthority //.autofsk //rootk //ansys_inc Failed Files on VM //.autofsk Luke K

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scap-security-guide July 2014