If password access is disabled on a cloud-based server - both from (virtual) console and via SSH - can the set of password checks be disabled somehow?
- 10 checks: Set Password Quality Requirements with pam_pwquality - 5 checks: Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attempts - 3 checks: Set Password Hashing Algorithm
Thanks, =Fen
On 6/7/17 12:04 PM, Fen Labalme wrote:
If password access is disabled on a cloud-based server - both from (virtual) console and via SSH - can the set of password checks be disabled somehow?
- 10 checks: Set Password Quality Requirements with pam_pwquality
- 5 checks: Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attempts
- 3 checks: Set Password Hashing Algorithm
OVAL has the ability to do conditional clauses, e.g. most of the SSH checks will be notapplicable/pass if sshd is not installed.
Can evaluate password access in sshd configs, but that's only for ssh server.... what do we check to see if password access is disabled for the entire system?
On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 1:41 PM, Shawn Wells shawn@redhat.com wrote:
OVAL has the ability to do conditional clauses, e.g. most of the SSH checks will be notapplicable/pass if sshd is not installed.
This is great, and on a cloud server in a fedramp certified facility one might think it enough, as how would someone log in other than by using SSH?
Can evaluate password access in sshd configs, but that's only for ssh
server.... what do we check to see if password access is disabled for the entire system?
I can't remember the process offhand, but I believe disabling pam_unix will prevent access to /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow.
=Fen
On 6/7/17 4:21 PM, Fen Labalme wrote:
On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 1:41 PM, Shawn Wells <shawn@redhat.com mailto:shawn@redhat.com> wrote:
OVAL has the ability to do conditional clauses, e.g. most of the SSH checks will be notapplicable/pass if sshd is not installed.This is great, and on a cloud server in a fedramp certified facility one might think it enough, as how would someone log in other than by using SSH?
Can evaluate password access in sshd configs, but that's only for ssh server.... what do we check to see if password access is disabled for the entire system?I can't remember the process offhand, but I believe disabling pam_unix will prevent access to /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow.
If you have the interest + time to document how to set this up, it'd be a worthwhile extension to the OVAL checks.
https://serverfault.com/questions/783082/how-to-use-the-ssh-server-with-pam-... might get you started
Does sshd need to be recompiled - in order to completely disable password authentication?
I would like to reduce the number of false positives in /var/log/secure ^.*sshd.*: Invalid user .* from .*$ ^.*sshd.*: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for .* failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!$ ^.* sshd.*: input_userauth_request: invalid user .*$ THIS MESSAGE IS FOR THE USE OF THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S) ONLY AND MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS PRIVILEGED, PROPRIETARY, CONFIDENTIAL, AND/OR EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER ANY RELEVANT PRIVACY LEGISLATION. No rights to any privilege have been waived. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, retransmission, dissemination, distribution, copying, conversion to hard copy, taking of action in reliance on or other use of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient and have received this message in error, please notify me by return e-mail and delete or destroy all copies of this message.
On 6/8/17 9:38 AM, Brent Kimberley wrote:
Does sshd need to be recompiled - in order to completely disable password authentication?
I would like to reduce the number of false positives in /var/log/secure
^.*sshd.*: Invalid user .* from .*$
^.*sshd.*: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for .* failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!$
^.* sshd.*: input_userauth_request: invalid user .*$
In theory, should be able to disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication, then call it a day. Never actually tried, though.
Not sure I understand the complete question.
We do person by person as in loading up authorized_keys with the personal rsa.pub key such as: cat .ssh/id_rsa.pub | ssh b@B 'cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys'. Will ask you for password to complete the task. Once done, should not ask for password until key changes.
The .ssh lives in the home folder of each user so that each user has a unique key loaded into their remote home folder.
This gives us passwordless ssh as well as positive identity of each individual to load them into the proper account. Same goes for root so that root will ssh into root.
Recompiling, must not. Positive ID, must have.
Am I way off base?
-----Original Message----- From: Shawn Wells [mailto:shawn@redhat.com] Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2017 10:28 PM To: scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
On 6/8/17 9:38 AM, Brent Kimberley wrote:
Does sshd need to be recompiled - in order to completely disable password authentication?
I would like to reduce the number of false positives in /var/log/secure
^.*sshd.*: Invalid user .* from .*$
^.*sshd.*: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for .* failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!$
^.* sshd.*: input_userauth_request: invalid user .*$
In theory, should be able to disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication, then call it a day. Never actually tried, though.
I believe the sshd directives to configure the daemon to use keys only for authentication is mostly all that's required to disable passwords. I've used this before. Be aware that it only affects using passwords to access the system via ssh though. You will also see password attempts failing in your logs from all the attacks your servers face.
You would still need user passwords for sudo access. To remedy that, there are two relatively simple methods, both have security flaws.
1. Disable password challenges in sudo rules, which I think is a horrible idea for security.
2. Use pam_ssh_agent_auth module and pam_sudo, and use ssh key agents on the clients. This will make sudo authenticate that the agent's key matched the user's authorized key for the authentication challenge. I don't presume to think this can't be compromised, but it's a workable solution and better than passwordless sudo.
On Jun 12, 2017 9:18 AM, "McIntyre, James T. (Farragut Suitland, MD)" < jmcintyre@nmic.navy.mil> wrote:
Not sure I understand the complete question.
We do person by person as in loading up authorized_keys with the personal rsa.pub key such as: cat .ssh/id_rsa.pub | ssh b@B 'cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys'. Will ask you for password to complete the task. Once done, should not ask for password until key changes.
The .ssh lives in the home folder of each user so that each user has a unique key loaded into their remote home folder.
This gives us passwordless ssh as well as positive identity of each individual to load them into the proper account. Same goes for root so that root will ssh into root.
Recompiling, must not. Positive ID, must have.
Am I way off base?
-----Original Message----- From: Shawn Wells [mailto:shawn@redhat.com] Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2017 10:28 PM To: scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
On 6/8/17 9:38 AM, Brent Kimberley wrote:
Does sshd need to be recompiled - in order to completely disablepassword authentication?
I would like to reduce the number of false positives in/var/log/secure
^.*sshd.*: Invalid user .* from .*$ ^.*sshd.*: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for .* failed -POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!$
^.* sshd.*: input_userauth_request: invalid user .*$In theory, should be able to disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication, then call it a day. Never actually tried, though.
scap-security-guide mailing list -- scap-security-guide@lists. fedorahosted.org To unsubscribe send an email to scap-security-guide-leave@ lists.fedorahosted.org
Method #3
If you are in a PKEnabled environment using CAC and pin# to login, you can add CAC information such as (example depends on CAC registration): /C=US/O=U.S. Government/OU=DoD/OU=PKI/OU=CONTRACTOR-or-USN-or-USMC-etc/CN=LASTNAME.FIRSTNAME.MIDDLENAME.DODID -> local_username to the top of /etc/pam.d/common-auth. This will cause the requirement of a CAC and pin# to get into sudo, su and possibly ssh as well.
Unfortunately this method might be impractical in that the /etc/pam.d/common-auth file only pertains to the local host it resides on. If you have 5 servers with this setting, you will need to move your CAC to the server you are sudoing into. Good for single local hosts but not so good with multiple remote hosts.
We might be deploying a KVM solution that provides CAC support so that whichever system you are switched to, CAC support is provided.
Otherwise Sean's method 2 would be a good solution where a user's key is passed and matched as an authorized key.
As a preventative measure for unauthorized password attempts would be setting a rule in IPTables to only allow specific networks to login. Even narrowing the rule down to specific IPs of your users or cloud services. I would have to dust off my rules but an example would be something like iptables -I INPUT -p tcp ! -s yourIPaddress --dport 22 -j DROP.
I know this is getting off topic but at least wanted to address reduction of unauthorized login errors.
-----Original Message----- From: Sean [mailto:smalder73@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, June 12, 2017 10:08 AM To: SCAP Security Guide Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
I believe the sshd directives to configure the daemon to use keys only for authentication is mostly all that's required to disable passwords. I've used this before. Be aware that it only affects using passwords to access the system via ssh though. You will also see password attempts failing in your logs from all the attacks your servers face.
You would still need user passwords for sudo access. To remedy that, there are two relatively simple methods, both have security flaws.
1. Disable password challenges in sudo rules, which I think is a horrible idea for security.
2. Use pam_ssh_agent_auth module and pam_sudo, and use ssh key agents on the clients. This will make sudo authenticate that the agent's key matched the user's authorized key for the authentication challenge. I don't presume to think this can't be compromised, but it's a workable solution and better than passwordless sudo.
On Jun 12, 2017 9:18 AM, "McIntyre, James T. (Farragut Suitland, MD)" jmcintyre@nmic.navy.mil wrote:
Not sure I understand the complete question.
We do person by person as in loading up authorized_keys with the personal rsa.pub key such as: cat .ssh/id_rsa.pub | ssh b@B 'cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys'. Will ask you for password to complete the task. Once done, should not ask for password until key changes.
The .ssh lives in the home folder of each user so that each user has a unique key loaded into their remote home folder.
This gives us passwordless ssh as well as positive identity of each individual to load them into the proper account. Same goes for root so that root will ssh into root.
Recompiling, must not. Positive ID, must have.
Am I way off base?
-----Original Message----- From: Shawn Wells [mailto:shawn@redhat.com] Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2017 10:28 PM To: scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org mailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
On 6/8/17 9:38 AM, Brent Kimberley wrote:
Does sshd need to be recompiled - in order to completely disable password authentication?
I would like to reduce the number of false positives in /var/log/secure
^.*sshd.*: Invalid user .* from .*$
^.*sshd.*: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for .* failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!$
^.* sshd.*: input_userauth_request: invalid user .*$
In theory, should be able to disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication, then call it a day. Never actually tried, though.
_______________________________________________ scap-security-guide mailing list -- scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org mailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org To unsubscribe send an email to scap-security-guide-leave@lists.fedorahosted.org mailto:scap-security-guide-leave@lists.fedorahosted.org
Alteration of #3:
You can use the CAC card as a certificate source for an ssh key directly. This should be forwardable via ssh agents etc., if that's reasonable. A KVM to switch around the CAC reader becomes unworkable at some point.
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 12:49 PM, McIntyre, James T. (Farragut Suitland, MD) jmcintyre@nmic.navy.mil wrote:
Method #3
If you are in a PKEnabled environment using CAC and pin# to login, you can add CAC information such as (example depends on CAC registration): /C=US/O=U.S. Government/OU=DoD/OU=PKI/OU=CONTRACTOR-or-USN-or-USMC-etc/ CN=LASTNAME.FIRSTNAME.MIDDLENAME.DODID -> local_username to the top of /etc/pam.d/common-auth. This will cause the requirement of a CAC and pin# to get into sudo, su and possibly ssh as well.
Unfortunately this method might be impractical in that the /etc/pam.d/common-auth file only pertains to the local host it resides on. If you have 5 servers with this setting, you will need to move your CAC to the server you are sudoing into. Good for single local hosts but not so good with multiple remote hosts.
We might be deploying a KVM solution that provides CAC support so that whichever system you are switched to, CAC support is provided.
Otherwise Sean's method 2 would be a good solution where a user's key is passed and matched as an authorized key.
As a preventative measure for unauthorized password attempts would be setting a rule in IPTables to only allow specific networks to login. Even narrowing the rule down to specific IPs of your users or cloud services. I would have to dust off my rules but an example would be something like iptables -I INPUT -p tcp ! -s yourIPaddress --dport 22 -j DROP.
I know this is getting off topic but at least wanted to address reduction of unauthorized login errors.
-----Original Message----- From: Sean [mailto:smalder73@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, June 12, 2017 10:08 AM To: SCAP Security Guide Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
I believe the sshd directives to configure the daemon to use keys only for authentication is mostly all that's required to disable passwords. I've used this before. Be aware that it only affects using passwords to access the system via ssh though. You will also see password attempts failing in your logs from all the attacks your servers face.
You would still need user passwords for sudo access. To remedy that, there are two relatively simple methods, both have security flaws.
- Disable password challenges in sudo rules, which I think is a horrible
idea for security.
- Use pam_ssh_agent_auth module and pam_sudo, and use ssh key agents on
the clients. This will make sudo authenticate that the agent's key matched the user's authorized key for the authentication challenge. I don't presume to think this can't be compromised, but it's a workable solution and better than passwordless sudo.
On Jun 12, 2017 9:18 AM, "McIntyre, James T. (Farragut Suitland, MD)" jmcintyre@nmic.navy.mil wrote:
Not sure I understand the complete question. We do person by person as in loading up authorized_keys with thepersonal rsa.pub key such as: cat .ssh/id_rsa.pub | ssh b@B 'cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys'. Will ask you for password to complete the task. Once done, should not ask for password until key changes.
The .ssh lives in the home folder of each user so that each userhas a unique key loaded into their remote home folder.
This gives us passwordless ssh as well as positive identity of eachindividual to load them into the proper account. Same goes for root so that root will ssh into root.
Recompiling, must not. Positive ID, must have. Am I way off base? -----Original Message----- From: Shawn Wells [mailto:shawn@redhat.com] Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2017 10:28 PM To: scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.orgmailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
On 6/8/17 9:38 AM, Brent Kimberley wrote: Does sshd need to be recompiled - in order to completelydisable password authentication?
I would like to reduce the number of false positives in/var/log/secure
^.*sshd.*: Invalid user .* from .*$ ^.*sshd.*: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for .*failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!$
^.* sshd.*: input_userauth_request: invalid user .*$ In theory, should be able to disable ChallengeResponseAuthenticationand PasswordAuthentication, then call it a day. Never actually tried, though.
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CAC support for the KVM is a good first step.
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/06/07/platinum-continues-to-ev...
From: Andrew Gilmore [mailto:agilmore2@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2017 12:23 AM To: SCAP Security Guide scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
Alteration of #3:
You can use the CAC card as a certificate source for an ssh key directly. This should be forwardable via ssh agents etc., if that's reasonable. A KVM to switch around the CAC reader becomes unworkable at some point.
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 12:49 PM, McIntyre, James T. (Farragut Suitland, MD) <jmcintyre@nmic.navy.milmailto:jmcintyre@nmic.navy.mil> wrote: Method #3
If you are in a PKEnabled environment using CAC and pin# to login, you can add CAC information such as (example depends on CAC registration): /C=US/O=U.S. Government/OU=DoD/OU=PKI/OU=CONTRACTOR-or-USN-or-USMC-etc/CN=LASTNAME.FIRSTNAME.MIDDLENAME.DODID -> local_username to the top of /etc/pam.d/common-auth. This will cause the requirement of a CAC and pin# to get into sudo, su and possibly ssh as well.
Unfortunately this method might be impractical in that the /etc/pam.d/common-auth file only pertains to the local host it resides on. If you have 5 servers with this setting, you will need to move your CAC to the server you are sudoing into. Good for single local hosts but not so good with multiple remote hosts.
We might be deploying a KVM solution that provides CAC support so that whichever system you are switched to, CAC support is provided.
Otherwise Sean's method 2 would be a good solution where a user's key is passed and matched as an authorized key.
As a preventative measure for unauthorized password attempts would be setting a rule in IPTables to only allow specific networks to login. Even narrowing the rule down to specific IPs of your users or cloud services. I would have to dust off my rules but an example would be something like iptables -I INPUT -p tcp ! -s yourIPaddress --dport 22 -j DROP.
I know this is getting off topic but at least wanted to address reduction of unauthorized login errors.
-----Original Message----- From: Sean [mailto:smalder73@gmail.commailto:smalder73@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, June 12, 2017 10:08 AM To: SCAP Security Guide Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
I believe the sshd directives to configure the daemon to use keys only for authentication is mostly all that's required to disable passwords. I've used this before. Be aware that it only affects using passwords to access the system via ssh though. You will also see password attempts failing in your logs from all the attacks your servers face.
You would still need user passwords for sudo access. To remedy that, there are two relatively simple methods, both have security flaws.
1. Disable password challenges in sudo rules, which I think is a horrible idea for security.
2. Use pam_ssh_agent_auth module and pam_sudo, and use ssh key agents on the clients. This will make sudo authenticate that the agent's key matched the user's authorized key for the authentication challenge. I don't presume to think this can't be compromised, but it's a workable solution and better than passwordless sudo.
On Jun 12, 2017 9:18 AM, "McIntyre, James T. (Farragut Suitland, MD)" <jmcintyre@nmic.navy.milmailto:jmcintyre@nmic.navy.mil> wrote:
Not sure I understand the complete question.
We do person by person as in loading up authorized_keys with the personal rsa.pub key such as: cat .ssh/id_rsa.pub | ssh b@B 'cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys'. Will ask you for password to complete the task. Once done, should not ask for password until key changes.
The .ssh lives in the home folder of each user so that each user has a unique key loaded into their remote home folder.
This gives us passwordless ssh as well as positive identity of each individual to load them into the proper account. Same goes for root so that root will ssh into root.
Recompiling, must not. Positive ID, must have.
Am I way off base?
-----Original Message----- From: Shawn Wells [mailto:shawn@redhat.commailto:shawn@redhat.com] Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2017 10:28 PM To: scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.orgmailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org <mailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.orgmailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org> Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
On 6/8/17 9:38 AM, Brent Kimberley wrote:
Does sshd need to be recompiled - in order to completely disable password authentication?
I would like to reduce the number of false positives in /var/log/secure
^.*sshd.*: Invalid user .* from .*$
^.*sshd.*: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for .* failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!$
^.* sshd.*: input_userauth_request: invalid user .*$
In theory, should be able to disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication, then call it a day. Never actually tried, though.
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THIS MESSAGE IS FOR THE USE OF THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S) ONLY AND MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS PRIVILEGED, PROPRIETARY, CONFIDENTIAL, AND/OR EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER ANY RELEVANT PRIVACY LEGISLATION. No rights to any privilege have been waived. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, retransmission, dissemination, distribution, copying, conversion to hard copy, taking of action in reliance on or other use of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient and have received this message in error, please notify me by return e-mail and delete or destroy all copies of this message.
Excellent OpenSSH security guidelines: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Guidelines/OpenSSH
As our servers are in the AWS (FedRAMP certified) cloud, there is no direct console/tty access - only via SSH.
While non-compliant, we like to have (for example) a remote SCAP scanning process log in as `oscap-user` and then run `sudo` (without a password) to scan will elevated privileges. As all ssh sessions time out after 15 minutes of inactivity, and as auditd logs who executes `sudo` why is disabling "password challenges in sudo rules ... a horrible idea for security"?
Thanks, =Fen
On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 10:07 AM, Sean smalder73@gmail.com wrote:
I believe the sshd directives to configure the daemon to use keys only for authentication is mostly all that's required to disable passwords. I've used this before. Be aware that it only affects using passwords to access the system via ssh though. You will also see password attempts failing in your logs from all the attacks your servers face.
You would still need user passwords for sudo access. To remedy that, there are two relatively simple methods, both have security flaws.
- Disable password challenges in sudo rules, which I think is a horrible
idea for security.
- Use pam_ssh_agent_auth module and pam_sudo, and use ssh key agents on
the clients. This will make sudo authenticate that the agent's key matched the user's authorized key for the authentication challenge. I don't presume to think this can't be compromised, but it's a workable solution and better than passwordless sudo.
On Jun 12, 2017 9:18 AM, "McIntyre, James T. (Farragut Suitland, MD)" < jmcintyre@nmic.navy.mil> wrote:
Not sure I understand the complete question.
We do person by person as in loading up authorized_keys with the personal rsa.pub key such as: cat .ssh/id_rsa.pub | ssh b@B 'cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys'. Will ask you for password to complete the task. Once done, should not ask for password until key changes.
The .ssh lives in the home folder of each user so that each user has a unique key loaded into their remote home folder.
This gives us passwordless ssh as well as positive identity of each individual to load them into the proper account. Same goes for root so that root will ssh into root.
Recompiling, must not. Positive ID, must have.
Am I way off base?
-----Original Message----- From: Shawn Wells [mailto:shawn@redhat.com] Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2017 10:28 PM To: scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
On 6/8/17 9:38 AM, Brent Kimberley wrote:
Does sshd need to be recompiled - in order to completely disablepassword authentication?
I would like to reduce the number of false positives in/var/log/secure
^.*sshd.*: Invalid user .* from .*$ ^.*sshd.*: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for .* failed -POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!$
^.* sshd.*: input_userauth_request: invalid user .*$In theory, should be able to disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication, then call it a day. Never actually tried, though.
scap-security-guide mailing list -- scap-security-guide@lists.fedo rahosted.org To unsubscribe send an email to scap-security-guide-leave@list s.fedorahosted.org
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Hi James. Why not use two keys to avoid using a static passphrase?
-----Original Message----- From: McIntyre, James T. (Farragut Suitland, MD) [mailto:jmcintyre@nmic.navy.mil] Sent: Monday, June 12, 2017 9:18 AM To: scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
Not sure I understand the complete question.
We do person by person as in loading up authorized_keys with the personal rsa.pub key such as: cat .ssh/id_rsa.pub | ssh b@B 'cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys'. Will ask you for password to complete the task. Once done, should not ask for password until key changes.
The .ssh lives in the home folder of each user so that each user has a unique key loaded into their remote home folder.
This gives us passwordless ssh as well as positive identity of each individual to load them into the proper account. Same goes for root so that root will ssh into root.
Recompiling, must not. Positive ID, must have.
Am I way off base?
-----Original Message----- From: Shawn Wells [mailto:shawn@redhat.com] Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2017 10:28 PM To: scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org Subject: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Disabling passwords in the cloud
On 6/8/17 9:38 AM, Brent Kimberley wrote:
Does sshd need to be recompiled - in order to completely disable password authentication?
I would like to reduce the number of false positives in /var/log/secure
^.*sshd.*: Invalid user .* from .*$
^.*sshd.*: reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for .* failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!$
^.* sshd.*: input_userauth_request: invalid user .*$
In theory, should be able to disable ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication, then call it a day. Never actually tried, though. THIS MESSAGE IS FOR THE USE OF THE INTENDED RECIPIENT(S) ONLY AND MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS PRIVILEGED, PROPRIETARY, CONFIDENTIAL, AND/OR EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER ANY RELEVANT PRIVACY LEGISLATION. No rights to any privilege have been waived. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any review, retransmission, dissemination, distribution, copying, conversion to hard copy, taking of action in reliance on or other use of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient and have received this message in error, please notify me by return e-mail and delete or destroy all copies of this message.
Hi,
if you want to disable certain checks, I suggest looking at creating a tailoring file, scap-workbench can be used for this: https://www.open-scap.org/resources/documentation/customizing-scap-security-...
regards, 0x2a
On 2017-06-07 18:04, Fen Labalme wrote:
If password access is disabled on a cloud-based server - both from (virtual) console and via SSH - can the set of password checks be disabled somehow?
10 checks: Set Password Quality Requirements with pam_pwquality
5 checks: Set Lockouts for Failed Password Attempts
3 checks: Set Password Hashing Algorithm
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0x2a -
Andrew Gilmore -
Brent Kimberley -
Fen Labalme -
McIntyre, James T. (Farragut Suitland, MD) -
Sean -
Shawn Wells