Top-post cause of BB :-( Private keys (if stored locally), for outgoing traffic, should reside in the users home-dir. Passwords should be replaced multi-factor strong auth's: card/token plus PIN. Any alterations of filesystem beyond /home can be detected+reported.

Full disc encryption on a athom demands some extra patience :-)

----- Oorspronkelijk bericht ----- Van: Bill Davidsen [mailto:davidsen@tmr.com] Verzonden: Saturday, June 29, 2013 10:07 PM W. Europe Standard Time Aan: Community support for Fedora users users@lists.fedoraproject.org Onderwerp: Re: retrofitting LUKS encryption on installed system

J.Witvliet@mindef.nl wrote:

-----Original Message----- From: users-bounces@lists.fedoraproject.org [mailto:users-bounces@lists.fedoraproject.org] On Behalf Of Fred Smith Sent: Friday, June 28, 2013 3:42 PM To: users@lists.fedoraproject.org Subject: retrofitting LUKS encryption on installed system

I've got a F19 installation that I'd like to turn into a fully encrypted system with LUKS.

There are many howtos on the web for encrypting a partition, but they all show doing it to /home. -----Original Message-----

No, just re-install. One partition with /boot and another with an encrypted volume-group, holding /, swap and the rest.

But before embarking on that trip, do you really need full disk encryption? I mean, the content of /usr is on any fedora-cd ;-) And when up-and-running, everything is unlocked.

The only valid reason I can think about, is that other people have physically access to your machine and could get root-access by booting from cd/dvd, and might alter your system.

If they have secret access they can install evil devices, but if you are protecting against theft (laptops) or someone with a search warrant (NSA) comes and takes your drives.

It surely works, but at a performance price. And the certainty that you have to enter the LUKS-key each time you boot.

The only safe place to store password info is in your head. If one other person has it it's not a secret, so you have to decide if losing the data is worse than having someone else get it. That's a policy decision, on-technical.

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