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On 09/25/2014 11:01 AM, John Hodrien wrote:
On Thu, 25 Sep 2014, Joakim Tjernlund wrote:
Yes, it is "my" job, not sssd's. Currently sssd dictate that no system ever should be allowed to login as root, no matter what.
SSSD dictates that no system should be allowed to login as root via SSSD, and that's not quite the same. You're a corner case where you're working against standard practice, but I can see why you think it should be possible to configure SSSD to allow it, given that you can strip away these sanity checks from PAM.
Just to reiterate what I said elsewhere in this thread (without CCing Joakim, sorry):
There are two reasons why SSSD refuses to handle root:
1) If SSSD was to crash, only root is capable of restarting it, debugging it or otherwise fixing the problem. So if you hit a bug and SSSD was the mechanism you used to log in as root, it cannot be fixed short of a reboot (and if the bug happens on every run because there was a regression in an update, your system is hosed.)
2) Without root in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, it's impossible to boot into single-user mode to fix any issues with the early boot process.
These are the reasons that SSSD doesn't handle the root user. It's not a matter of a default, it's a matter of protecting users from an inevitable catastrophe. No matter how hard we try, bugs will always creep in. If you can't get in to fix them, then a bug becomes a disaster.