devel January 2022

devel@lists.fedoraproject.org

269 participants
360 discussions

Claim delve
by Alejandro Saez Morollon 29 Jun '22

29 Jun '22

Hi there, folks. Delve[0] (a Golang debugger) was retired due to the impossibility of building a new version of delve for dependencies issues. I would like to claim the package and fix the situation. I already have one of the dependencies[1] in the works. I already talked with the original maintainer (he's in cc) and he is OK with it. Thanks. [0] https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/delve [1] https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/golang-starlark

2 2

[HEADS UP] -Wl,--as-needed is added in rawhide
by Igor Gnatenko 26 Jun '22

26 Jun '22

It's in redhat-rpm-config-118-1.fc30. If it causes any problems for you - let me know. In the meantime, you can use `%undefine _ld_as_needed` to disable it. Thanks for attention! -- -Igor Gnatenko

4 4

Wine MinGW system libraries
by Zebediah Figura 11 Jun '22

11 Jun '22

Hello all, I'm a contributor to the Wine project. To summarize the following mail, Wine needs special versions of some of its normal dependencies, such as libfreetype and libgnutls, built using the MinGW cross-compiler, and I'm sending out a mail to major distributions in order to get some feedback from our packagers on how these should be built and packaged. For a long time Wine has built all of its Win32 libraries (DLLs and EXEs) as ELF binaries. For various reasons related to application compatibility, we have started building our binaries as PE instead, using the MinGW cross-compiler. It is our intent to expand this to some of our dependencies as well. The list of dependencies that we intend to build using MinGW is not quite fixed yet, but we expect it to include and be mostly limited to the following: * libvkd3d * libFAudio * libgnutls * zlib (currently included via manual source import) * libmpg123 * libgsm * libpng * libjpeg-turbo * libtiff * libfreetype * liblcms2 * jxrlib and dependencies of the above packages (not including CRT dependencies, which Wine provides). There is currently some internal discussion about how these dependencies should be built and linked. There are essentially three questions I see that need to be resolved, and while these resolutions have a significant impact on the Wine building and development process, they also have an impact on distributions, and accordingly I'd like to get input from our packagers to ensure that their considerations are accurately taken into account. (1) Should we build via source import, or link statically, or dynamically? Static linking and source imports are dispreferred by Fedora [1] [2], as by many distributions, on the grounds that they cause duplication of libraries on disk and in memory, and make it harder to update the libraries in question (see also question 2). They also make building and bisecting harder. Note however that if they are linked dynamically, we need to make sure that we load our packages instead of MinGW builds of open-source libraries with applications ship with. Accordingly we need each library to be renamed, and to link to renamed dependencies. For example, if application X ships with its own copy of libfreetype-6.dll, we need to make sure that our gdi32.dll links to libwinefreetype-6.dll instead, and that libwinefreetype-6.dll links to libwineharfbuzz-0.dll and winezlib.dll. I think, although I haven't completely verified yet, that this can be done just with build scripts (i.e. no source patches), by using e.g. --with-zlib=/path/to/winezlib.dll. Accordingly, although static linking and source imports are generally disprefered, it may quite likely be preferable in our case. We don't get the benefits of on-disk deduplication, since Wine is essentially the only piece of software which needs these libraries. (2) If we use dynamic libraries, should dependencies be included in the main wine package, or packaged separately? This is mostly a question for packagers, although it also relates to (3). I expect that Fedora (and most distributions) want to answer "packaged separately" here, on the grounds that this lets them update (say) Wine's libgnutls separately, and in sync with ELF libgnutls, if some security fix is needed. There is a snag, though: we need libraries to be copied into the prefix (there's some internal effort to allow using something like symlinks instead, but this hard and not done yet). Normally we perform this copy every time Wine is updated, but if Wine and its dependencies aren't updated on the same schedule, we may end up loading an old version of a dependency in the prefix, thus missing the point of the update. (3) If dependencies are packaged separately, should Wine build them as part of its build tree (e.g. using submodules), or find and link (statically or dynamically) to existing binaries? Linking to existing binaries is generally preferable: it avoids duplication on disk; it reduces compile times when compiling a single package from source (especially the first time). However, we aren't going to benefit from on-disk duplication. And, most importantly, unlike with ELF dependencies, there is no standardized way to locate MinGW libraries—especially if it comes to Wine-specific libraries. We would need a way for Wine's configure script to find these packages—and ideally find them automatically, or else fall back to a submodule-based approach. If we rely on distributions to provide our dependencies, the best idea I have here would be something like a x86_64-w64-mingw32-pkg-config. And if we use shared libraries rather than static, things get worse: we need to know the exact path of each library and its dependencies so that we can copy (or symlink) them into a user's WINEPREFIX. For what it's worth, the current proposed solution (which has the support of the Wine maintainer) involves source imports and submodules. There's probably room for changing our approach even after things are committed, but I'd still like to get early feedback from distributions, and make sure that their interests are accurately represented, before we commit. In short, it's not clear whether distributions want their no-static-library policies to apply to us as well, or whether we're enough of a special case and would be enough of a pain to package that they'd rather we deal with the hard parts, and I don't want us to make any assumptions. ἔρρωσθε, Zebediah [1] https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/#packaging-static… [2] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Bundled_Libraries

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What to do with packages that fail to install since Fedora 34 but BZs are ASSIGNED?
by Miro Hrončok 10 Jun '22

10 Jun '22

Hello, during the Fedora 34 development cycle a year ago, I've reported the following buzgillas about packages that don't install: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/buglist.cgi?bug_status=ASSIGNED&f1=blocked&f2=b… They were set to ASSIGNED by their maintainers but since then, they still don't install on Fedora 34, Fedora 35 or Fedora 36. I see no point in keeping such packages in the repositories, yet the policy does not currently allow to do anything other than keep them. Should I take some steps, or do we keep building and shipping the broken packages forever? -- Miro Hrončok -- Phone: +420777974800 IRC: mhroncok

5 8

OpenJDK and unremoved directories
by Vitaly Zaitsev 25 May '22

25 May '22

Hello. I have a lot of unremoved directories and files in /usr/lib/jvm/: $ ls -l /usr/lib/jvm/ total 140 drwxr-xr-x. 5 root root 4096 Sep 10 14:32 java-11-openjdk-11.0.12.0.7-4.fc34.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Mar 14 2017 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.121-10.b14.fc25.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Apr 21 2017 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.131-1.b12.fc25.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Oct 25 2017 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.151-1.b12.fc26.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Oct 25 2017 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.151-1.b12.fc27.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Jan 24 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.161-0.b14.fc27.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Feb 6 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.161-5.b14.fc27.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Mar 29 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.162-3.b12.fc27.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Apr 18 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.171-1.b10.fc27.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Apr 25 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.171-4.b10.fc27.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Apr 25 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.171-4.b10.fc28.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Jul 3 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.172-12.b11.fc28.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Jun 18 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.172-9.b11.fc28.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Jul 23 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.181-7.b13.fc28.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Sep 5 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.181.b15-0.fc28.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Oct 4 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.181.b15-5.fc28.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Oct 11 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.181.b15-6.fc28.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Oct 11 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.181.b15-6.fc29.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Nov 29 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.191.b12-11.fc29.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Nov 1 2018 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.191.b12-8.fc29.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Jan 14 2019 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.191.b13-0.fc29.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Feb 6 2019 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.201.b09-2.fc29.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Mar 26 2019 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.201.b09-6.fc29.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Apr 23 2019 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.212.b04-0.fc29.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Apr 23 2019 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.212.b04-0.fc30.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Jul 31 2019 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.222.b10-0.fc30.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Oct 16 2019 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.232.b09-0.fc30.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Oct 16 2019 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.232.b09-0.fc31.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Jan 28 2020 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.242.b08-0.fc31.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Mar 23 2020 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.242.b08-1.fc32.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 May 4 2020 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.252.b09-0.fc32.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 May 22 2020 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.252.b09-1.fc32.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Jul 17 2020 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.262.b10-1.fc32.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Jul 28 2020 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.265.b01-1.fc32.x86_64 drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Oct 21 2020 java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.272.b10-0.fc32.x86_64 lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 21 Sep 10 14:32 jre -> /etc/alternatives/jre lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 24 Sep 10 14:32 jre-11 -> /etc/alternatives/jre_11 lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 32 Sep 10 14:32 jre-11-openjdk -> /etc/alternatives/jre_11_openjdk lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 41 Aug 31 18:50 jre-11-openjdk-11.0.12.0.7-4.fc34.x86_64 -> java-11-openjdk-11.0.12.0.7-4.fc34.x86_64 lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 29 Sep 10 14:32 jre-openjdk -> /etc/alternatives/jre_openjdk I think the OpenJDK's scriplets need to be adjusted to remove everything. -- Sincerely, Vitaly Zaitsev (vitaly(a)easycoding.org)

2 1

Uninitialized variables and F37
by Steve Grubb 16 May '22

16 May '22

Hello, This is a continuation of the discussion from F36 Change: GNU Toolchain Update. Uninitialized variables are a big problem. They can be sources of information exposure if parts of a buffer are not initialized. They can also cause unexpected execution paths if the attacker can groom the memory to a value of their choosing. If the variable is a pointer to heap, this can cause free to corrupt memory under certain circumstances. If the uninitialized memory is part of user input, this can lead to improper input validation. This is not hypothetical. All of these come from a paper doing an emprical study of android flaws. [1] The data used in the paper is here. [2] Part of the problem is that compilers and static analysis tools can't always find them. I created a test program that has 8 uses of unintialized variables. Gcc 11 misses all of them. Gcc 12 finds 2. Clang 13 finds 1. cppcheck finds 2 or 3 - but does so much complaining you'd think it found all. Valgrind finds 2. Flexelint, a commercial linter, finds 1. Since tools can't always find them, the only option we have right now is force initialization to something the attacker cannot control. Kees Cook started a discussion on the llvm developers mail list a while back. He makes a very clear argument. I would be repeating his points, so please read the original discussion here (also read the replies): https://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/cfe-dev/2020-April/065221.html He talks about -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero being used for production builds and -ftrivial-auto-var-init=<pattern> being used for debug builds. The use is not just the kernel. Consider a server that returns data across the network to a client. It could possibly leak crypto keys or passwords if the returned data structure has uninitialized memory. For more background, the creator of this technology for LLVM presented a talk about this feature at a past LLVM developer conference: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-XUHPimq3o He said this would have prevented over 900 fixed CVE's in Chrome and 12% of all Android CVE's. From deep inside the LLVM thread above, comes this nugget: --- To add in, we (Microsoft) currently use zero initialization technology in Visual Studio in a large amount of production code we ship to customers (all kernel components, a number of user-mode components). This code is both C and C++. We already have had multiple vulnerabilities killed because we shipped this technology in production. We received bug reports with repros that worked on older versions of Windows without the mitigation and new versions of Windows that do have it. The new versions don't repro, the old ones do. --- Microsoft is also digging in to uninitialized variables. They have a lengthy blog post that talks about extending this to heap memory. [3] I think this would be an important step forward to turn this on across all compilations. We could wipe out an entire class of bugs in one fell swoop. But then, what about heap allocations? Calloc has existed for a long time. It might be worthwhile to have a CFLAG that can tell glibc (or other allocators) to substitute something like calloc for malloc. Cheers, -Steve [1] - https://picture.iczhiku.com/resource/paper/shkeTWJEaFUuWCMc.pdf [2] - http://ml-papers.gitlab.io/android.vulnerabilities-2017/appendix/ MSR2017/vulnerabilitiesList.html [3] - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/07/02/solving-uninitialized-kernel-poo…

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Heads-up: grpc 1.41.0 coming to Rawhide with C (core) and C++ soname bumps
by Ben Beasley 09 May '22

09 May '22

In one week (October 6), or slightly later, I will build grpc 1.41.0 for Rawhide (F36). Fedora 35 will remain on 1.39.1. As is traditional for minor releases of grpc, the C++ ABI was broken (soversion bumped from 1.40 to 1.41). This time, the C (core) ABI was also broken (soversion bumped from 18 to 19). I will coordinate builds in a side tag of packages that use the C (core) and/or C++ libraries. Maintainers of the following packages should have received this email directly: • bear • frr • perl-grpc-xs Packages that use the Python bindings should be unaffected, as there should be no incompatible API changes: • buildstream • python-chirpstack-api • python-etcd3 • python-google-api-core • python-google-cloud-core • python-grpc-google-iam • python-opencensus (orphaned) • python-opencensus-proto • python-opentelemetry • python-pytest-grpc • python-xds-protos

1 1

ppc64le build failure on F34 and EPEL8, EPEL8-next only
by Germano Massullo 13 Apr '22

13 Apr '22

Good day. darktable maintainer here. I am experiencing a ppc64le build failure on F34 and EPEL8, EPEL8-next only. https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=81021540 https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/taskinfo?taskID=81021476 On F34 the error is /builddir/build/BUILD/darktable-3.8.0/src/iop/channelmixerrgb.c: In function '_convert_GUI_colors.part.0.constprop': /builddir/build/BUILD/darktable-3.8.0/src/iop/channelmixerrgb.c:3085:1: internal compiler error: in patch_jump_insn, at cfgrtl.c:1299 3085 | } | ^ Please submit a full bug report, with preprocessed source if appropriate. Other branches can successfully build on aarch64, x86_64, pcc64le. Do you know what can be the problem? Thank you

2 8

GNOME only: KeepassXC quirks
by Germano Massullo 01 Mar '22

01 Mar '22

KeepassXC comaintainer here. There are many Fedora GNOME Wayland users experiencing quirks in using KeepassXC. Textboxes not showing text that is being written, other quirks with GNOME, etc. Upstream developers said many times that this only happen with Fedora users. Myself I do use KDE Spin and I do not experience these issues (tested on Wayland too) I don't paste bugs titles since they are misleading https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1925130 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1941731 (CentOS 8) https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1954742 https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/5608 plus others that I cannot find again at the moment I would like to ask if you have any idea about why this happens on GNOME only (and not on other distros too) Thank you

10 30

Release criteria proposal: networking requirements
by Adam Williamson 01 Mar '22

01 Mar '22

Hi folks! So at this week's blocker review meeting, the fact that we don't have explicit networking requirements in the release criteria really started to bite us. In the past we have squeezed networking-related issues in under other criteria, but for some issues that's really difficult, notably VPN issues. So, we agreed we should draft some explicit networking criteria. This turns out to be a big area and quite hard to cover (who'd've thought!), but here is at least a first draft for us to start from. My proposal would be to add this to the Basic criteria. I have left out some wikitext stuff from the proposal for clarity; I'd add it back in on actually applying the proposed changes. It's just formatting stuff, nothing that'd change the meaning. Anyone have thoughts, complaints, alternative approaches, supplements? Thanks! === Network requirements === Each of these requirements apply to both installer and installed system environments. For any given installer environment, the 'default network configuration tools' are considered to be those the installer documents as supported ways to configure networking (e.g. for anaconda-based environments, configuration via kernel command line options, a kickstart, or interactively in anaconda itself are included). ==== Basic networking ==== It must be possible to establish both IPv4 and IPv6 network connections using DHCP and static addressing. The default network configuration tools for the console and for release-blocking desktops must work well enough to allow typical network connection configuration operations without major workarounds. Standard network functions such as address resolution and connections with common protocols such as ping, HTTP and ssh must work as expected. Footnote titled "Supported hardware": Supported network hardware is hardware for which the Fedora kernel includes drivers and, where necessary, for which a firmware package is available. If support for a commonly-used piece or type of network hardware that would usually be present is omitted, that may constitute a violation of this criterion, after consideration of the [[Blocker_Bug_FAQ|hardware-dependent- issues|normal factors for hardware-dependent issues]]. Similarly, violations of this criteria that are hardware or configuration dependent are, as usual, subject to consideration of those factors when determining whether they are release-blocking ==== VPN connections ==== Using the default network configuration tools for the console and for release-blocking desktops, it must be possible to establish a working connection to common OpenVPN, openconnect-supported and vpnc-supported VNC servers with typical configurations. Footnote title "Supported servers and configurations": As there are many different VPN server applications and configurations, blocker reviewers must use their best judgment in determining whether violations of this criterion are likely to be encountered commonly enough to block a release, and if so, at which milestone. As a general principle, the more people are likely to use affected servers and the less complicated the configuration required to hit the bug, the more likely it is to be a blocker. -- Adam Williamson Fedora QA Community Monkey IRC: adamw | Twitter: AdamW_Fedora | XMPP: adamw AT happyassassin . net http://www.happyassassin.net

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devel January 2022